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The Silence of Section 15: 
Searching for Equality at the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 2007 
Daphne Gilbert* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The initial impetus behind this article was to carry out a year-in-
review-style analysis of key developments in the Supreme Court’s 2007 
cases on section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 
As those who have followed the Court’s equality jurisprudence might 
anticipate, this project is complicated by the fact that section 15 
developments in the Court’s 2007 rulings were implicit or incidental, not 
overt. The Equality Rights provision was only referred to in four cases, 
and in each instance the Court’s reasoning was very brief, amounting at 
best to a handful of paragraphs. To undertake the usual kind of case-by-
case analysis that is standard in year-in-review articles would, in these 
circumstances, make for a very brief (and perhaps somewhat depressing) 
bit of scholarship. While the Supreme Court may have been subdued in 
its equality rights jurisprudence in 2007, equality-seekers should not 
ignore what did (or did not) happen in the past year. The absence — or 
perhaps even avoidance — of equality analysis at the Supreme Court 
demands as much scrutiny as years past when the Court made section 15 
its focus.  
The last significant equality decisions were decided in the 2004 
term, and those cases radically changed the landscape of section 15 
litigation.2 Equality claimants are still dealing with the fall-out. Perhaps 
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1
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2
  In 2004 the Supreme Court decided Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Auton”], Hodge v. 
Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hodge”], Newfoundland Treasury Board v. N.A.P.E., [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, 
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the Supreme Court is taking a step back to let the dust settle. This 2007 
year-in-review is, therefore, less concerned with the task of analyzing the 
Court’s legal reasoning, obiter dicta and decision-making on section 15, 
in favour of exploring instead the Court’s apparent evasion of equality 
analysis in the past year. This paper seeks to investigate the subtexts of 
what did not happen at the Supreme Court in 2007 with respect to 
section 15, and inquires into the consequences of that silence for 
equality-seeking groups in Canada. 
Part II of the paper will begin by considering the explicit section 15 
analysis in 2007, by reviewing in brief the cases of Charkaoui v. Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration),3 Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop,4 
Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. 
British Columbia5 and Baier v. Alberta.6 The Court’s refusal to engage in 
any substantive equality analysis in these cases closes the door to future 
equality claims (perhaps even slamming the section 15 door shut for 
now), thereby narrowing the utility of section 15, both as a normative 
tool and as a practical legal mechanism for realizing equality. The fact 
that the Court did not acknowledge equality implications in any of the 
2007 cases is a troubling indication of where it is in its thinking on 
section 15. Part III then places the 2007 developments (such as they are) 
into the context of the Supreme Court’s post-Law7 jurisprudence in 
section 15. Equality advocates, intervenors, academics and litigants, 
faced with such superficial analysis, had reason to despair in 2007; this 
part of the paper will chronicle three urgent challenges facing equality 
litigants as we move forward in coming years.  
                                                                                                             
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “N.A.P.E.”]; Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 
S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (S.C.C.) and Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the 
Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6,
 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law”]. Each of these cases individually 
contributed to significant developments in s. 15 analysis. Together they represent a dramatic 
departure from the equality values and principles established by the Court in earlier decisions. See 
infra, at note 8 for a brief description of these four cases.  
3  [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”]. 
4
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hislop”]. 
5
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services”]. 
6
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baier”]. 
7
  Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”]. The Law decision set out the Court’s unified position on 
how s. 15 should be analyzed. A controversial decision when issued, it had been refined and 
narrowed significantly in the years following. The 2004 year offered dramatic developments to the 
Law formulation. While less startling, more recent decisions, including the Hislop case, supra, note 
4, mark a shift in the Court’s focus from substantive to formal equality models.  
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II. SECTION 15 IN 2007 
None of the four cases that expressly mentioned section 15 offered 
any substantive development in how we understand or approach equality 
rights under the Charter. This might be something for which many of us 
are quite grateful, given the rapid and unfortunate developments in 
section 15 over the past few years.8 The Court’s brevity however, is still 
                                                                                                             
8
  The 2004 cases each represented a significant blow to equality litigants and advocates. 
The four main s. 15 decisions that year precipitated new challenges, as detailed below. These 
decisions combine to impose significant restrictions on the availability and utility of equality 
analysis at the Supreme Court: 
(i)  The Hodge decision added a further step to the s. 15 test developed in the Law case. In 
Hodge, the Supreme Court entrenched the comparator group as essential to each of the 
three steps in the Law analysis (see Hodge, supra, note 2, at para. 17). Justice Binnie set 
out the criteria for identifying the appropriate comparator group as follows (at para. 23):  
The appropriate comparator group is the one which mirrors the characteristics 
of the claimant (or claimant group) relevant to the benefit or advantage 
sought except that the statutory definition includes a personal characteristic 
that is offensive to the Charter or omits a personal characteristic in a way that 
is offensive to the Charter.  
 The language of “mirrors” evokes the “similarly situated” test that had been discredited 
by earlier s. 15 jurisprudence as leading only to a formal equality analysis.  
(ii)  The Auton decision, supra, note 2, which followed Hodge, reaffirmed the emergence of 
the “similarly situated” approach to equality analysis, and also illustrated the significant 
burden the comparator group step now places on claimants. In Auton, the claimants had 
their comparator group changed by the Supreme Court in a way that altered the essence 
of their claim. The comparator group chosen by the Court compared the claimants right 
out of the health care benefit they sought, by juxtaposing them with a group that was also 
excluded from health care coverage.  
(iii)  In N.A.P.E., supra, note 2, the Supreme Court agreed that the Newfoundland 
government’s decision to abandon a Pay Equity Agreement breached the s. 15 rights of 
women workers. However, this was held to be justified under s. 1 of the Charter because 
of the province’s state of fiscal emergency at the relevant time. There have been many 
critiques launched against the N.A.P.E. decision, including complaints about the low 
burden of proof (and paucity of required evidentiary record) to substantiate the fiscal 
crisis, and the fact that a government was allowed to make budgetary arguments on the 
backs of women workers (as opposed to choosing a non-Charter violating way of dealing 
with the emergency).  
(iv)  The decision in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law, supra, note 2, 
illustrated the problems in analyzing dignity under the Law formulation. A majority of 
the Court found that a Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 provision that justified the 
“reasonable” use of force by parents and teachers against children, did not violate a 
child’s dignity. The dignity analysis in Law was assessed on a subjective/objective basis 
and asked whether a reasonable person, possessing all the same characteristics and in the 
same circumstances as the claimant, would be demeaned or devalued by the impugned 
legislation. The Court added a further qualifier, noting (at para. 68), “Children often feel 
a sense of disempowerment and vulnerability; this reality must be considered when 
assessing the impact of s. 43 on a child’s sense of dignity.” This reasoning compounds 
the dignity challenge. Not only must the legislation be assessed from the point of view of 
a reasonable child who might be subject to physical “correction” by a parent or teacher, 
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a cause for concern. What little it did say on equality did nothing to 
improve the state of affairs in equality litigation, and its failure to 
elaborate further on a theoretical or jurisprudential approach to section 
15 leaves us stuck in the quagmire of the 2004 decisions. We begin then 
with a brief summary of each of the four section 15 cases decided by the 
Supreme Court in 2007.9 
1.  Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 
In Charkaoui, the Court concluded its section 15 analysis in three 
short paragraphs.10 The claimant argued that provisions of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act11 discriminated against non-
citizens, contrary to the Charter. The impugned provisions allowed the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, and the Minister of Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness to issue a certificate declaring that a 
foreign national or permanent resident was inadmissible to Canada on 
the ground of security concerns (or other listed grounds), leading to the 
detention of the person named in the certificate. If a judge determined 
the certificate to be reasonable, the named person should be removed 
from Canada with no appeal possible. The Supreme Court found that the 
process violated section 7,12 but did not find a violation of section 15 of 
the Charter. Relying on its earlier decision in Chiarelli,13 the Court 
                                                                                                             
but that reasonable child must be understood to already feel disempowered and 
vulnerable. It is difficult to imagine how that analysis can be described with adequate 
precision for trial judges or carried out with any degree of principle. 
9
  In “Supreme Court of Canada Constitutional Cases 2007: Defining Access to Justice” 
(2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 517, Patricia Hughes notes that there were other cases with possible 
equality dimensions at the Supreme Court of Canada in 2007, though they were not framed or 
argued as s. 15 cases. These include Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] S.C.J. No. 54, 2007 SCC 54 
(S.C.C.) and Alliance for Marriage and Family v. A. (A.), [2007] S.C.J. No. 40, 2007 SCC 40 
(S.C.C.). The Court also decided a significant statutory human rights case in Council of Canadians 
with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 15, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.). The 
VIA Rail decision also had equality issues at play, though they were not framed as Charter 
arguments.  
10
  Supra, note 3, at paras. 129-31. 
11
  S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”]. 
12
  On the s. 7 issue the Court concluded (id., at para. 65):  
… the secrecy required by the scheme denies the named person the opportunity to know 
the case put against him or her, and hence to challenge the government’s case. This, in 
turn, undermines the judge’s ability to come to a decision based on all the relevant facts 
and law.  
This violated s. 7 of the Charter and could not be saved by s. 1.  
13
  Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] S.C.J. No. 27, 
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chiarelli”]. 
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reasoned that section 6 of the Charter (Mobility Rights)14 explicitly 
permits differential treatment of citizens and non-citizens in deportation 
matters. In Chiarelli, Sopinka J. concluded:  
… [section] 6 of the Charter specifically provides for differential 
treatment of citizens and permanent residents in this regard. While 
permanent residents are given various mobility rights in s. 6(2), only 
citizens are accorded the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada in 
s. 6(1). There is therefore no discrimination contrary to s. 15 in a 
deportation scheme that applies to permanent residents, but not to 
citizens.15  
In Charkaoui, however, the claimant did not argue that deportation of 
non-citizens was per se unconstitutional. Rather, he focused instead on 
the particular ways in which this scheme operated, arguing that two 
aspects of the legislative process were unconnected to deportation and 
hence subject to section 15 scrutiny. This disconnect would mean that 
the holding in Chiarelli on section 6 of the Charter should have no 
impact on the section 15 argument.  
The claimant focused on the indefinite possibility of detention 
inherent in the way the legislation was implemented. Deportation could 
be impossible, either because it is indefinitely postponed or legally 
impossible (if, for example, the subject would be deported to face 
torture), or because deportation is practically unlikely because the 
Minister decides to hold a person indefinitely on security grounds. If the 
detention is not leading to a removal order, it goes beyond immigration 
matters to constitute discrimination against non-nationals. In essence, the 
claimant argued that the IRPA scheme permitted the Minister to 
indefinitely detain a suspected non-national terrorist in a way that could 
never be constitutional if the suspect was a Canadian citizen. If the 
lengthy detention was not intended to lead to deportation, it should 
constitute a violation of section 15 on the grounds of national or ethnic 
origin, race or an analogous ground.  
                                                                                                             
14  The relevant parts of s. 6 read:  
6. (1) Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada. 
(2) Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident 
of Canada has the right  
(a)  to move to and take up residence in any province; and  
(b)  to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.  
15
 Id., at 741. 
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The Supreme Court rejected this argument without going into any 
detail, concluding:  
Even though the detention of some of the appellants has been long … 
the record on which we must rely does not establish that the detentions 
at issue have become unhinged from the state’s purpose of deportation. 
More generally, the answer to these concerns lies in an effective review 
process that permits the judge to consider all matters relevant to the 
detention …16  
This is all that the Court could muster on the section 15 issue. It did not 
interrogate the distinction argued by the claimant. The reference to the 
need for an “effective review process” imports section 1 justificatory 
arguments into this very brief section 15 mention.  
2.  Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop  
The Hislop case was the only 2007 decision that was based squarely 
on section 15. Hislop was a class action challenge to amendments to the 
Canada Pension Plan17 that extended survivor benefits to same-sex 
partners. Under section 44(1.1) of the CPP, eligibility for survivor 
benefits was limited to same-sex partners whose “spouse” died on or 
after January 1, 1998. The claimants challenged section 44(1.1), along 
with three other sections of the amended legislation, arguing that the 
under-inclusive amendments violated section 15. The substantive section 
15 analysis is sparse in Hislop, in part because the only argument 
advanced by government on section 15 was a comparator group analysis 
that the Supreme Court summarily rejected. The Court acknowledged 
that the choice of comparator group is “essential” to the question of 
differential treatment.18 The government chose a comparator group based 
on a temporal distinction (which would not be an enumerated or 
analogous ground), arguing that at issue was the legislative distinction 
between survivors whose partners died before January 1, 1998 and those 
whose partners died on or after that date. The Court redefined the chosen 
comparator group and concluded:  
It is the purpose of the MBOA itself that determines the appropriate 
comparator group. What must be compared is the subset of same-sex 
                                                                                                             
16
  Charkaoui, supra, note 3, at para. 131.  
17
  Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8. 
18
  Hislop, supra, note 4, at para. 37. 
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survivors that remains excluded from the CPP survivor’s benefits, i.e. 
those whose partners died before January 1, 1998, and similarly 
situated opposite-sex survivors.19  
In this brief comparator group discussion in the majority opinion, the 
disheartening tangential lesson is the Court’s repeated assertion that the 
choice of a comparator group is an essential component in the 
assessment of differential treatment for the purposes of section 15. For 
those who have struggled with the consequences of the 2004 Hodge 
decision,20 which affirmed the centrality of comparator groups to any 
section 15 claim, Hislop confirms that the Hodge analysis was not 
simply an unfortunate blip on the equality radar.  
The primary significance of Hislop lies in the Court’s conclusions on 
the appropriate remedy. The Court set out guiding principles for the 
application of retroactive Charter remedies.21 There is one particular part 
of the remedies discussion that has important equality ramifications: the 
point of difference between the majority and concurrence in Hislop on 
whether the Court’s 1999 decision in M. v. H.22 marked a “substantial 
change in the law” in same-sex equality rights. In M. v. H., a majority of 
the Supreme Court held that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the 
definition of “spouse” in the Ontario Family Law Act violated section 
15. In Hislop, the majority characterized M. v. H. as a watershed 
moment23 — a clear shift in the law from the Court’s position in Egan24 
four years earlier. Justice Bastarache disagreed, and looked at the split 
decision in Egan, and lower court judgments both before and after Egan 
as indications that support for same-sex equality rights was building and 
gaining momentum long before the Court’s decision in M. v. H.25 This 
point of contention is extremely significant to Hislop as it provided the 
basis on which the majority was able to forgive the government’s failure 
to extend benefits equally to same-sex couples. The Court fashioned a 
test for the prospective and retroactive award of remedies that asks first 
                                                                                                             
19
  Id., at para. 38. 
20
  Supra, note 2. 
21
  For a thorough discussion of the Hislop decision from a Charter remedies focus see 
Daniel Guttman, “Hislop v. Canada: A Retroactive Look” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 547. 
22
  [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
23
  Hislop, supra, note 4, at para. 110. 
24
  Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Egan”]. In Egan, a slim majority of the Court held a definition of “spouse” that reserved Old Age 
Security Act benefits to opposite-sex couples did violate s. 15 but could be saved under s. 1 of the 
Charter. 
25
  Hislop, supra, note 4, at paras. 147-57. 
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whether a substantial change in the law has occurred through the judicial 
decision.26 If there has been a substantial change in the law, other issues 
like fairness to the litigants, good faith reliance by government and the 
need to respect the constitutional rule of legislatures will be considered 
in deciding whether to award a retroactive remedy.27 
By reaffirming — even reifying — its position as the ultimate arbiter 
of constitutional rights, the Court took an unusual posture in the ongoing 
debate around legislative and judicial dialogue. It is well settled that the 
Constitution gives ultimate authority to the courts in deciding whether a 
law conforms to constitutional dictates. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized however, that this power is muted by an ongoing 
responsive conversation with legislatures. While the Supreme Court may 
pronounce a law unconstitutional, governments are free to respond with 
legislation that overcomes the constitutional deficiency. It is also true 
that in most cases, courts are pronouncing on the minimum 
constitutional floor of legislative action. This could certainly be one way 
of seeing the Egan decision, as described by Bastarache J. The Court’s 
view in Hislop that its decision in Egan relieved the government from 
any further obligation to legislate a same-sex benefit scheme is an 
extraordinarily deferential posture to governmental inaction. While this 
may make for greater constitutional certainty (from the Court’s point of 
view), it is not principled from an equality perspective.28 Justice 
Bastarache (disagreeing with the majority on this point) argued in 
Hislop: 
[G]iven the contradictory decisions both before and after Egan, the 
closeness of the decision in that case, and the difficult nature of the 
issues at stake, it is difficult to see Egan as definitively establishing 
what the Constitution required. The reality is that it was for a time 
unclear exactly how s. 15(1) would apply to same-sex couples. The 
judicial process can be slow. It took time for this Court and others to 
articulate the correct constitutional principles to be applied to 
legislative exclusions of same-sex couples. That does not mean that 
                                                                                                             
26
  Id., at para. 99. 
27
  Id., at para. 100. 
28
  At a conference to celebrate the launch of the Women’s Court of Canada, Bruce Porter 
spoke about s. 15 and the lack of progressive remedies. See Bruce Porter, panelist on “Living up to 
the Charter: Government Accountability in the Court Room”, Re-writing Equality. University of Toronto 
(March 7, 2008). Webcast available on the University of Toronto Faculty of Law conference website, 
online at: <http://www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty_content.asp?itemPath=1/13/0/0/0&contentId=1707>. 
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this Court was upsetting established law when it handed down its 
decision in M. v. H.29 
Defining the correct approach to retroactive Charter remedies is 
especially significant in equality cases where claims present the threat of 
financial obligations for governments, and where the courts are 
concerned with cut-off dates and claimant-group certainty. The 
majority’s approach in Hislop gives the Court the ultimate say in 
pronouncing on what is, or is not, a discriminatory practice. Given the 
nature of judicial processes, such an emphasis on judicial authority 
allows governments extra months and even years to perpetuate 
constitutional wrongs (without the risk of financial consequences) even 
when they should have known legislative change was both required and 
inevitable.  
3. Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining 
Assn. v. British Columbia  
B.C. Health Services is a decision with significant equality 
ramifications, even though its section 15 reasoning was neither 
substantive nor lengthy. The appellants challenged provisions of Bill 29, 
British Columbia provincial legislation that invalidated important 
provisions of collective agreements then in force, and effectively 
precluded meaningful collective bargaining on a number of specific 
issues. The case was primarily argued under the section 2(d) Freedom of 
Association clause of the Charter. The section 15 claim was based on 
several interrelated, enumerated and analogous grounds including: sex, 
employment in the health care sector, and status as non-clinical workers. 
The trial judge noted that the workers affected by Bill 29 were almost all 
women, working in jobs stereotyped as “women’s work”.30 The Supreme 
Court of Canada found that Bill 29 did not amount to differential 
treatment based on a personal characteristic, because the adverse effects 
of the legislation related “to the type of work [the claimants] do, and not 
to the persons they are”.31  
                                                                                                             
29
  Hislop, supra, note 4, at para. 157. 
30
  Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
[2003] B.C.J. No. 2107, 2003 BCSC 1379, at paras. 161-63 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health 
Services, Trial Decision”]. 
31
  B.C. Health Services, supra, note 5, at para. 165. 
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B.C. Health Services is a disappointing opinion from an equality 
perspective, given the Court’s cursory, one-paragraph dismissal of the 
equality claim, in a situation where all levels of court acknowledged that 
the workers affected were women doing “women’s work”. The failure to 
unpack that reality in a more complicated equality analysis is 
problematic, both for the case itself and for what it indicates about the 
Court’s broader approach to section 15. Had the Court simply declined 
to analyze the case under section 15, one might conclude that it was 
avoiding a complicated equality analysis because it saw the opportunity 
to rest its decision on another, much simpler, analysis. It did not make 
that choice, however, and instead offered a hollow endorsement of the 
trial judgment without bothering to interrogate the problematic 
assumptions underlying that decision.  
The Court still struggles with both the theory and practice of 
intersectionality and the possibility that equality claims can be, and often 
are, based on more than one ground.32 The Supreme Court in B.C. Health 
Services simply accepted the trial judge’s reasoning that the impugned 
legislation segregated different sectors of employment in accordance 
with long-standing labour practices, and not for any nefarious reasons. 
The trial judge’s reasons were lengthier on this point, and while she 
clearly did not support the discrimination claim, she did reference the 
possibility that occupational status could be an analogous ground.33 
Justice Garson quoted L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Dunmore34 and Delisle.35 In 
Delisle, L’Heureux-Dubé J. argued: 
[O]ccupation and working life are often important sources of personal 
identity, and there are various groups of employees made up of people 
                                                                                                             
32
  A good example of how the Supreme Court has struggled with intersectionality is its 
decision in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 
(S.C.C.). Gosselin was decided on the basis of the enumerated ground of “age” and McLachlin 
C.J.C. in fact described the Gosselin and Law (supra, note 7) situations as “strikingly similar”. The 
factual bases of the two cases were completely different. Gosselin was a challenge by an 
impoverished, psychologically troubled and socially disadvantaged woman to a provincial welfare 
scheme. Law was a challenge by a young self-employed widow to a survivor benefits scheme. The 
only similarity between the two cases was the age of the claimants. The Court could describe them 
as similar because its equality analysis proceeded only on the simple enumerated ground of age, 
uncomplicated by gender, class or other factors. For further elaboration on this point, see Daphne 
Gilbert, “Substance without Form: The Impact of Anonymity on Equality-Seeking Groups” (2006) 
3:1 UOLTJ 225. 
33
  B.C. Health Services, Trial Decision, supra, note 30, at para. 179ff. 
34
  Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 
(S.C.C.). 
35
  Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 
(S.C.C.).  
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who are generally disadvantaged and vulnerable. Particular types of 
employment status, therefore, may lead to discrimination in other 
cases, and should be recognized as analogous grounds when it has been 
shown that to do so would promote the purposes of s. 15(1) of 
preventing discrimination and stereotyping and ameliorating the 
position of those who suffer social and political disadvantage and 
prejudice.36  
In fact, the statistics in B.C. Health Services are quite shocking, as 
described in the trial judgment: 
There is no dispute that the majority of workers affected by Bill 29 are 
female. 98% of nurses in British Columbia are women. 85% of HEU 
[Hospital Employees Union] members are women. 90% of BCGEU 
[British Columbia Government Employees Union] workers in the 
community subsector are women. Many health care workers are 
immigrants or members of visible minorities. 27% of HEU members 
self-identify as members of visible minorities in comparison to 18% of 
British Columbia as a whole.37 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s reasoning in Delisle seems directly analogous, 
or arguably applicable, in B.C. Health Services. Similarly in Dunmore, 
she reiterated her belief that occupational status could be an analogous 
ground arguing:  
In this case, there is no doubt that agricultural workers, unlike the 
RCMP officers in Delisle, do generally suffer from disadvantage, and 
the effect of the distinction is to devalue and marginalize them within 
Canadian society. Agricultural workers “are among the most 
economically exploited and politically neutralized individuals in our 
society” and face “serious obstacles to effective participation in the 
political process” …38  
Women workers in stereotypically gendered occupations are likewise a 
historically disadvantaged group who suffer both social and political 
consequences. The political powerlessness is particularly evident here 
given this targeted legislative initiative. If these female-dominated 
unions had political clout, surely they would have been able to hold the 
government to its negotiated agreements. The intersecting oppressions of 
                                                                                                             
36 Id., at para. 8, quoted by Garson J. in B.C. Health Services, Trial Decision, supra, note 
30, at para. 173.  
37
  B.C. Health Services, Trial Decision, id., at para. 161. 
38
 Dunmore, supra, note 34, at para. 168 (emphasis in original). 
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gender and occupational status were worthy of greater analysis by the 
Court.  
The Supreme Court’s most egregious failing in its limited equality 
analysis in B.C. Health Services is its apparent unwillingness to 
conceptualize the case as one of adverse effects discrimination. Given an 
obviously segregated workforce, one wonders why an analogous ground 
argument was even necessary under section 15. It is apparent on the facts 
that the case could have been analyzed as a straight adverse effects sex 
discrimination claim, avoiding the need to contemplate an intersectional 
analysis. The overlapping grounds however, certainly add a nuanced 
dimension to the discrimination claim; dismissing the section 15 claim 
outright on the basis that occupational status is not a personal characteristic 
in this overtly gendered context is very simplistic reasoning.  
4. Baier v. Alberta 
At issue in Baier39 was the constitutionality of provincial legislation 
that prohibited school board employees from running in an election and 
serving as school board trustees. The case was primarily argued and 
decided as a Freedom of Expression case and the appellants failed to 
show a violation of section 2(b). However, the appellants also argued 
that they faced discrimination, as compared to municipal employees, on 
the analogous ground of occupational status. The Court rejected the 
section 15 claim in one paragraph, holding that the occupational status at 
issue here did not meet the criteria outlined in Corbiere40 for finding an 
analogous ground. The appellants were not part of a discrete and insular 
minority, their occupation was not a suspect marker of discrimination, 
nor was their occupation an immutable characteristic.41  
Although the section 15 reasoning in Baier is short, it is not 
particularly objectionable on the facts. A majority of the Court has never 
agreed that occupational status constitutes an analogous ground. The 
dicta by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Delisle and Dunmore that opened the 
door to that possibility, likely does not apply to this category of workers. 
School board employees are not a gendered, politically vulnerable group, 
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  [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.). 
40
  Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24, 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (S.C.C.). 
41
  Id., at para. 13.  
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nor are they historically marginalized or exploited. Baier can be 
distinguished in this respect from B.C. Health Services. 
III. CONCERNS REGARDING THE POST-LAW SECTION 15 
JURISPRUDENCE 
To the extent that the Supreme Court said anything at all about 
section 15 in 2007, it did nothing to address or dispel the criticism that 
the Court’s recent equality cases have engendered. Since 2004 — a 
watershed year in which the Court decided Hodge,42 Auton,43 N.A.P.E.,44 
the Same-Sex Marriage Reference45 and the so-called “Spanking Law” 
case of Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law46 — 
academics, intervenors and litigants have been assessing the “damage” 
to efforts to foster and promote substantive equality within the 
framework of the 1999 Law decision. Outside of the Supreme Court, it is 
commonly understood that the cumulative effect of the 2004 decisions 
was to mark a significant retreat from a substantive model of equality 
analysis to a formal model of treating “likes” alike and “unalikes” 
differently. There have been numerous workshops and volumes of 
scholarship on the demise of section 15’s potential,47 however three areas 
are of particular concern, particularly in light of the Court’s 2007 silence 
on equality. First is the ongoing debate on the content that should be 
given to the idea of “human dignity”, the touchstone of equality analysis 
after the Law decision.48 Second is the increasing prominence of 
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  [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.). 
43
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.). 
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  [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 (S.C.C.). 
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  [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (S.C.C.). 
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  [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.). 
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 Two recent edited collections on the evolution of s. 15 are Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike 
& M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality under the 
Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006); and Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers, eds., Diminishing 
Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Markham, ON: LexisNexis 
Canada, 2006) [hereinafter “Diminishing Returns”]. Each of these collections came together after 
weekend-long workshops on the dismal plight of equality litigation. In March 2007, the Women’s 
Court of Canada was launched with a conference and the publication of a special issue of the 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law (2006) 18(1) C.J.W.L., containing six rewritten Supreme 
Court decisions on s. 15. There have also been many other academic papers and panels at 
conferences.  
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  In Law, Iacobucci J. offered a “specific, albeit non-exhaustive, definition” of human 
dignity which included the realization of personal autonomy, feelings of self-respect and self-worth, 
physical and psychological empowerment; and a concern with the way an individual legitimately 
feels when confronted with a particular legislative goal (see Law, [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 
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comparator groups as the central feature of the section 15 model of 
analysis. Third is the relationship between section 15 and section 1. Even 
though the equality analyses were brief, each of these existing areas of 
concern was exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in 2007.  
1. Dignity 
The usefulness of “dignity” as a defining feature of section 15 has 
been both defended and decried.49 It seems clear that human dignity is an 
important, indeed even obvious part of assessing equality. What is 
unclear is how an analysis of a concept as nebulous as dignity can or 
should be done. The Supreme Court of Canada has struggled with what 
dignity means, and the case law is at best unhelpful and at worst harmful 
to any notion that section 15, as currently interpreted, can in fact 
promote human dignity in practice. The 2007 equality cases did not 
contain any dignity analysis. Baier50 and Charkaoui51 never passed the 
initial stage of the Law52 analysis requiring claimants to demonstrate 
differential treatment on an enumerated or analogous ground. Hislop53 
was only argued on the basis of the disputed comparator group and the 
government conceded the law infringed the claimants’ dignity. In B.C. 
Health Services, the Supreme Court agreed that there was no differential 
treatment based on a personal characteristic and concluded: “… we see 
no reason to depart from the view of the trial judge that these effects on 
health care workers, however painful, do not, on the evidence adduced in 
this case, constitute discrimination under s. 15 of the Charter.54 While 
this does not mean the Court would have found a dignity infringement 
had the analysis proceeded, the passing reference to “painful” effects of 
legislative action is indicative of one of the problematic aspects of 
                                                                                                             
S.C.R. 497, at para. 53 (S.C.C.)). The Court said these characteristics should be analyzed from a 
subjective-objective point of view, taking into account the claimant’s own feelings as experienced 
by a “reasonable” claimant sharing the same experiences: id., at paras. 59-61. 
49  See, e.g., Peter Hogg, “What Is Equality? The Winding Course of Judicial Interpretation” 
(2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 39; Sonia Lawrence, “Harsh, Perhaps Even Misguided: Developments in 
Law, 2002” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 93; Sophia R. Moreau, “The Promise of Law v. Canada” 
(2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 415; Denise G. Réaume, “Discrimination and Dignity” (2003) 63 Louisiana L. 
Rev. 645. 
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  Supra, note 39. 
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  [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.). 
52
  Supra, note 48. 
53
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.). 
54
  B.C. Health Services, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 166 (S.C.C.).  
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adjudicating dignity under Law. It remains unclear what goes into the 
definition of “human dignity” in section 15, and while describing an 
experience as “painful” might be misconstrued by claimants as 
sympathy, or perhaps as condescension from the Court, its exact legal 
consequences are vague. Similarly emotive language was used by the 
lower courts. At the trial level the judge described the claimants as 
“aggrieved”55 and at the Court of Appeal the claimants were 
acknowledged to be “angry”.56 Neither of the lower court judgments 
considered the legislation to be dignity-infringing. 
2. Comparator Groups 
The second controversial point in section 15 jurisprudence 
exacerbated in 2007 is the rising prominence of comparator groups.57 In 
Hislop58 the comparator group issue was the only substantive section 15 
argument advanced by the government. The Court was quickly 
dismissive of the government’s argument that a comparator group based 
on a temporal distinction was appropriate. It instead looked at the 
purpose of the amendments in question and acknowledged that the core 
comparison should be based on the decision to treat same-sex couples 
differently from opposite-sex couples in allocating benefits before a 
certain date (January 1, 1998). In the Hislop case, this is certainly the 
more appropriate comparator, though what is unfortunate is the Supreme 
Court’s adherence to the need for a single comparator group model of 
analysis. The rigidity of the Hodge59 formulation created difficulties at 
the lower level in B.C. Health Services.60 Justice Garson struggled to 
locate a single, appropriate comparator and in the end, despite 
expressing discomfort with the claimants’ choice, never decided on what 
the appropriate comparator should be. She concluded:  
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  B.C. Health Services, Trial Decision, supra, note 30, at para. 189. 
56  Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
[2004] B.C.J. No. 1354, 2004 BCCA 377, at para. 137 (B.C.C.A.). 
57 For an elaboration of a critique of Hodge see: Daphne Gilbert & Diana Majury, “Critical 
Comparisons: The SCC Dooms Section 15” (2006) 24 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 111; Sophia R. 
Moreau, “Equality Rights and the Relevance of Comparator Groups” (2006) 5 J.L. & Equality 81; 
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Fairest of Them All”, in Diminishing Returns, supra, note 47, at 135. 
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  Supra, note 53. 
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  [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.). 
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  Supra, note 54. 
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The plaintiffs define their comparator group for the purposes of the 
first branch of the Law test as those public sector workers who do not 
work in the most female dominated sectors. I find it difficult to apply a 
comparator group that has the basis of the s. 15 claim infused into its 
description. However, accepting for the purposes of this analysis that 
this is an appropriate comparator group, I do not see how Bill 29 draws 
a distinction between the plaintiffs and this comparator group on the 
basis of personal characteristics.61 
This conclusion both confirms the circular logic of the comparator group 
model, and shows how difficult an exercise it is to choose a single 
comparator group. The claimants in B.C. Health Services defined 
themselves as women in stereotypically gendered women’s occupations. 
This was the basis of their claim of discrimination. If comparison is 
necessary to ground a section 15 claim, how else could the essence of 
their claim be uncovered if not by comparison to those workers in non-
gendered occupations? It is that comparison that most revealingly shows 
the consequences of the impugned legislation. Justice Garson’s concern 
that her comparator group not be “infused” with the ground of the 
section 15 claim not only makes the analysis completely abstract and 
artificial, it also belies the model of analysis used in Hodge and Auton, 
two recent (and controversial) Supreme Court comparator group 
decisions. In Hodge, the claimant was defined as a former common law 
spouse and compared to former married (i.e., divorced) spouses. The 
comparison between common law and marriage relationships was the 
basis of the section 15 issue for both the claimant and the government. 
Similarly, in Auton the claimants, autistic children wanting funding for a 
specific kind of behavioural therapy, were compared to “non-disabled 
[people] or [people] suffering a disability other than a mental disability 
… seeking or receiving funding for a non-core therapy important for his 
or her present and future health, which is emergent and only recently 
becoming recognized as medically required”.62 The Supreme Court’s 
chosen comparator group is based entirely on the essence of the section 
15 claim, focusing as it does on the nature of the treatment and whether 
others receive funding. Surely if comparison is required, and is in fact, 
central to the whole section 15 analysis, we cannot limit it to 
comparisons that make no reference to the basis of the alleged 
discrimination. Justice Garson’s reasoning at the trial level shows how 
difficult the comparator group step is in the section 15 process. She feels 
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obligated to point out a need to disconnect the claimants from their 
claim, in order to bring some integrity to the search for a single “correct” 
comparator. Yet, she decides not to elaborate the comparator analysis. 
This step has proven to be unworkable and unprincipled at the Supreme 
Court and the confusion trickles down.  
3. Section 15 and Section 1 
A third issue of concern is the relationship between section 15 and 
section 1. There are three ways the interaction between these two 
sections manifests in problematic ways in equality analysis. First is the 
kind of situation we saw in the N.A.P.E. case where the government of 
Newfoundland was allowed to justify breaching a pay equity agreement 
(in violation of section 15) by arguing extreme financial circumstances.63 
Allowing governments to use a fiscal crisis to justify discriminatory 
treatment creates a certain intractable tension in the relationship between 
Equality Rights and section 1.  
A second problem stems from the nature of the Law test and its 
focus on human dignity. Discrimination premised on a finding that 
differential treatment promotes a view that the claimant is less capable or 
less worthy of recognition as a human being (the words used in Law to 
describe what is short-formed as the “human dignity” step),64 and 
justifying such a result in a section 1 argument is an unsavoury (perhaps 
even untenable) position for governments to be in. In Lavoie v. Canada, 
McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ. (writing in dissent) emphasized that 
the burden of justifying a finding of discrimination should be “onerous” 
and emphasized that it will be a “rare case” where it will be considered 
reasonable to discriminate.65 In Lavoie, a discriminatory hiring practice 
was justified at the section 1 stage, but since then the Court has preferred 
to narrow its approach to section 15, making it ever harder for claimants 
to prove a claim of discrimination. The Court clearly struggles with how 
to rationalize a dignity infringement. This narrowing was evident in 
2007 in B.C. Health Services,66 Baier67 and Charkaoui,68 none of which 
made it to a substantive section 15 analysis.  
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A third concern about the relationship between section 15 and 
section 1 is the import of rationalization or justification into the section 
15 analysis. In an article on the problematic consequences of an overly 
deferential approach to government policies at the section 15 stage, 
Sheila McIntyre concluded that the Supreme Court was shifting from an 
adverse effects model of discrimination to a focus on “reasonable 
governmental intentions and rational statutory designs”.69 In her view, 
this undermines equality claims in three ways, each of which is a 
pertinent criticism of the decision in B.C. Health Services.  
First, a move away from considering claims of adverse effect 
discrimination allows systemic inequalities, and especially inequalities 
based on intersecting vulnerabilities, to be unexamined in the Court’s 
analysis. In B.C. Health Services, the Court’s simultaneous recognition 
of the gendered employment context and its decision that occupational 
status here was not a “personal characteristic” left the systemic 
inequality of stereotyped “women’s work” unanalyzed.  
Second, once the Court’s focus is located on the reasonableness of 
government decision-making, rather than on the disadvantage occasioned 
by the decisions, “… the legitimacy of judicial second-guessing of 
legislative line-drawing becomes a live issue”.70 In B.C. Health Services, 
the Court did not consider whether the occupational status at issue could 
be described as an analogous ground under section 15. It instead adopted 
the reasoning of the trial judge, who concluded:  
The government has made a policy decision with respect to the 
health care system that has adversely affected the employment interests 
of a group whose composition is linked to s. 15 characteristics. 
However, the fact that this group is predominantly female does not 
constitutionally shield it from governmental action that may adversely 
affect them without evidence that it is being subject to differential 
treatment on the basis of s. 15 characteristics.71 
This is surprisingly circular reasoning. The claimants argued discrimination 
on the basis of the intersecting grounds of sex, occupational status and 
status as non-clinical workers. Their unions were specifically targeted by 
the impugned legislation, and their unions are predominantly composed 
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of women performing stereotypically gendered work like nursing and 
hospital/community support. The government was shielded by the 
court’s inability or refusal to analyze the systemic inequality of labour 
practices. The trial judge’s statement precisely describes what an adverse 
effects model of discrimination analysis is meant to uncover, but she 
does not engage in the analysis and the Supreme Court simply accepts 
this reasoning.  
The third way that judicial deference to government policy 
undermines equality is, as McIntyre argues, that the equation of 
reasonable legislative choices with non-discrimination has incorporated 
intention into the section 15 analysis. She concludes, “[u]nless the court 
finds that the government purpose itself is discriminatory or that its 
ground-based distinctions are based on stereotypes that the Court 
recognizes as such, it will tend to find no discrimination.”72 In B.C. 
Health Services, the Court held: “the distinctions made by the Act relate 
essentially to segregating different sectors of employment, in accordance 
with the long-standing practice in labour regulation of creating 
legislation specific to particular segments of the labour force.”73 There 
was no consideration given to whether it is a “long-standing practice” to 
discriminate against women workers or for governments to be more 
dismissive when the work at issue is “women’s work”. The Court treated 
the government’s decision as “neutral” and in accordance with ordinary 
labour practices, without unpacking whether those practices are 
systematically discriminatory. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 2007 decisions on section 15 can perhaps best be described as 
unsettling. There were no dramatic pronouncements, no shifts in 
substance, no new “tests” or formalities. The relative brevity is still a 
cause for concern. The Court missed opportunities to address the 
increasingly vocal criticism of its equality jurisprudence. The 2007 cases 
might have offered a chance to acknowledge unfortunate developments 
and to offer some guidance in restoring a vision of section 15 that 
focuses on substantive equality.  
Equality-seekers should also be concerned in particular with the 
decision in B.C. Health Services. The Court’s failure to analyze the 
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section 15 claim as either one of intersecting gender/occupational status 
discrimination or adverse effects discrimination may have serious 
repercussions in efforts to promote gender equality through the Charter.  
The emphasis in Hodge74 and Auton75 on comparator groups, and the 
interrelationship of section 15 and section 1 in N.A.P.E.76 combined to 
drastically curtail the potential for progressive substantive equality 
analysis in their aftermath. Since then, the Court has rested on its section 
15 laurels and other issues and Charter rights have risen to the fore —
section 7 and section 2 in particular. The language of equality — the 
rhetoric with which section 15 arguments are created and upon which 
they are based — is impoverished, leaving claimants with, at best, a 
limited (and increasingly dated) toolbox of equality precedents with 
which to build their arguments. The Supreme Court no longer seems 
willing to critically engage with what it has called the most conceptually 
difficult Charter right. 
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